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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE UNDER
REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS
Previous to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Com-
pany,' notice by publication was the only notice given in many probate
and related proceedings. This decision undoubtedly will require
changes in notice procedure.
The Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company established a com-
mon trust fund. One hundred and thirteen trusts participated in the
common trust fund, the gross capital of which amounted to nearly three
million dollars. In the proceeding settling the trustee's account, the
only notice given resident and non-resident beneficiaries was by publica-
tion in a local newspaper. Mullane was appointed guardian and attor-
ney for all beneficiaries not appearing. He objected that the notice
and the statutory provisions2 governing notice were inadequate to afford
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and argued that the
New York Court was without jurisdiction to render a final and binding
decree.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that an elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the ac-
tion and afford them an opportunity to present their claims and objec-
tions.8 Where the names and addresses are at hand, the reasons dis-
appear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise the bene-
ficiaries of the pendency of the action. The trustee had on its books
the names and addresses of the income beneficiaries, and the Court
found no tenable ground for dispensing with a serious effort to inform
them personally of the accounting, at least by mail to the record
addresses.4
The Court drew some distinctions between in rem and in personam
actions. Some actions have been classed in rem because personal serv-
ice was not required, and others have held personal service not required
because the action was in rem. Without unduly criticising the useful-
nes of the distinctions between in rein and in personam actions, the
Court held notice to be insufficient regardless of the class of the par-
ticular action.
170 S.Ct. 652 (1950).2 Banking Law of New York, § et seq., 100-c subds. 9, 12.
3 See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339 (1940) ; Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385, 34 S.Ct. 779 (1913).
4Copare Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259 (1928), with Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927).
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Judgments in personam, without personal service, obtained ex parte
against parties, if upheld and enforced would be subject to abuse. A
proceeding without proper notice may cut off rights to have a trustee
answer for negligence, or may diminish interests by fees and expenses
to someone acting for the beneficiaries, but without their knowledge
or authority. Beneficiaries certainly may be deprived of property rights,
thus the notice and hearing must meet the standards of due process.
As far back as Pennoyer v. Neff5 the Supreme Court said that a
personal judgment is without validity if rendered against persons not
personally notified. Substituted service and notification by publication
is sufficient when real property is under control of the court; when
the action is in personam, such service by publication is ineffectual for
any purpose.
Even where a proceeding may be brought in rem or quasi in rem,
service by publication against a non-resident cannot support a personal
judgment. Statutes declaring such judgments binding have been de-
clared unconstitutional., A judgment in rem cannot be made the basis
of a judgment in personam, at least without giving the notice required
for a judgment in personam.7
The Mullane case is startling and revolutionary to the Wisconsin
lawyer. Many lawyers in matters of probate, trust, and related pro-
ceeding have listed heirs, beneficiaries, or all interested parties and pub-
lished in a legal periodical. This was the only notice given in many
cases and was allowed by the Courts. Under Wisconsin Statutes3 the
court may order copies of notice mailed to known interested parties,
but is not required to do so. Statutes controlling other proceedings
refer to the same notice statute.
In future proceedings notice by mail to all interested known parties
will be necessary. Published notice is sufficient for those whose inter-
ests and addresses are unknown. It seems plausible that the rule of the
Mullane case should apply to all trust, probate and similar proceedings.
The statutes and proceedings must be construed and conducted accord-
ing to the requirements of due process set forth by the Supreme Court
in the Mullane case.
Past proceedings may also be affected by this decision. Many de-
crees have been issued where the only notice given known interested
parties was by publication. These proceedings may be reopened. A
curative or a limitation statute is needed to settle arising difficulties
regarding such proceedings.
595 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 563 (1877).
0 Smith-Hurd Stats., c. 120, §§ 812, 816, 818, 820, 822 (Ii.).
7Barnett v. Cook County, 373 Ill. 516, 26 N.E. (2d) 862 (1940).8 Wis. Stat. § 324.18 (1949).
9 Wis. Stats. §§ 310.04, 315.03, 316.35, 317.11, 318.12 (1949).
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A curative statute is a retrospective law passed by a legislature
which affects past cases and existing rights.10 A curative act may not
be constitutional. The legislature can cure by subsequent legislation
defects or irregularities which it might have dispensed with or made
immaterial by prior law. It is familiar law that the legislature may
validate an act or proceeding only if it could have authorized it in the
first instance." Curative statutes are particularly applicable to irregu-
larities in procedure, but they are ineffectual where want of authority
or jurisdiction to act is lacking. Jurisdictional defects cannot be cured.
Generally the want of sufficient notice to satisfy due process is a
jurisdictional defect which cannot be cured.'
The legislature may enact a statute of limitations to halt contest
of defective proceedings if a reasonable time is allowed for the asser-
tion of rights before the statute operates as a bar. The principle men-
tioned above ts to curative statutes does not necessarily apply to a
statute of limitations. Such a statue will bar any right if a reasonable
time is afforded an interested party within which to enforce his right.
Such a statute relating to these defective proceedings would seem not
to violate any requirements of due process set forth by the Supreme
Court.' 3
There are various holdings as to what periods of limitation have
been held reasonable and unreasonable. 4 The Supreme Court has held
a six month limitation to be reasonable in some cases. 5 The majority.
of cases listed in the A.L.R. notes cited infer that a six month limita-
tion would not be unreasonable or repugnant to any provision of the
Constitution of the United States. If all actions contesting closed pro-
ceedings where there were defects in sufficiency of notice were sub-
ject to a six month limitation statute, it would seem to be a reasonable
limitation and should cure the proceedings made defective by the de-
cision in the Mullane case. For sufficient notice in future proceedings
the word may in our Wisconsin notice statute8 should be changed
to shall.
EUGENE F. KOBEY
10 140 A.L.R. 959.
"Kimball v. Town of Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407, 24 Am. Rep. 421 (1877); State
ex rel Neacy v. Milwaukee, 150 Wis. 616, 138 N.W. 76 (1912); State ex rel
Ervin v. County Board, 163 Wis. 577, 158 N.W. 338 (1916).
12See 128 A.L.R. 1405; 134 A.L.R. 791; 171 A.L.R. 1352.
's See Swanson v. Pontralo, 238 Ia. 297, 27 N.W. (2d) 21 (1947).
14 49 A.L.R. 1263; 120 A.L.R. 758.
15 Wheller v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 11 S.Ct. 76 (1890) ; Turner v. New York,
168 U.S. 90, 18 S.Ct. 38 (1897).
16 Supra, Note 8.
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